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ABSTRACT:
Electoral professionalism, a. term first coined by Panebianco (1988}, explains the
changing organisational structure of modern political parties and changes to the way parties
engage with the electorate. This thesis demonstrates the extent to which electoral
professionalism was prevalent during the 2004 Australian federal election campaign.
Australian democracy has undergone a process of professionalisation in recent decades.
The Liberal Party and the Labor Party's ability to adapt to these changes has enabled
Australia's two r:najor parties to remain relevant and come to dominate Australia's political
system. Campaign professionals skilled in areas such as polling, marketing, media
management, computer technologies, direct mail technics, and public relations now
dominate Australia's major parties. This thesis highlights the actions of these campaign
professionals during the 2004 election campaign in order to demonstrate how electoral
professionalism has evolved since Panebianco's first writings. Electoral professionalism
sees parties create efficient and effective ways of communicating with the electorate. As a
result, the 2004 election was characterised by the intensification of existing campaign
techniques and the implementation of some new campaign techniques. The implementation
of new political technology, the continued attempt to seek partisan advantage and the
increased need to secure funds to pay for rising campaign expenditure were all on display in
the lead-up to and during the 2004 federal election.
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. INTRODUCTION:
Panebianco (1988) first identified the changing organisational structure of

political parties as they underwent a process of professionalisation. Ward (1991) was the
first Australian political scientist to systematically apply the electoral professional model
of party to Australia's major parties. The adoption of electoral professionalism by the
major parties has enabled them to remain relevant in the wake of massive social
change. Electoral professionalism has caused political parties to become increasingly
dependent upon campaign professionals. The skills and expertise that campaign
professionals provide political parties with enables them to successfully compete in a
changing political environment. The most significant change caused by the adoption of
the electoral professional model has been to the organisational structure of political
parties. Australia's two major parties now have a more influential role for campaign
professionals than they once did. The transformation from mass party, a party built
around paid memberships, to an electoral professional party, has altered the way in
which the major parties engage the electorate. Campaign professionals have therefore
come to dominate political parties as they have become the new link between the party
and the electorate.
The 2004 federal election campaign included many aspects of electoral
professionalism. It saw the intensification of existing campaign techniques and the
introduction of new campaign techniques, such as telephone messaging and email. The
major parties intensified their efforts to extend control over the political messages that
they conveyed to the public. The use of negative advertising by the major parties
intensified a~ they attempted to attack the way' in which their political opponents had
been packaged. The 2004 election was also characterised by the way in which the
incumbent government sought to extend its partisan advantage. This saw the tools of
government harnessed to aid party campaign strategy. The 2004 election was
conducted over a longer than usual six-week period and was preceded by a lengthy
'phoney' campaign. 1 The 'phoney' campaign is a period in which the major parties begin
campaigning well before the announcement of an election date (Young 2004, 7). Mann
and Ornstein (2000) have termed this 'permanent campaigning'. The extended length of
campaigning led the major parties to seek out increased funding to pay for rising
1

With the exception of 1984, all recent election campaigns have been conducted over a 28 day period (The Sydney
Morning Herald, August 30, 2004).

campa1gmng costs. In many instances this entrenches the major parties electoral
dominance, contributing to what has been termed a 'cartelisation' of politics (Mair and
Katz 1995). The extent to which cartelisation has taken hold in Australia remains highly
contested (Marsh 2006).
SIGNIFICANCE:
This study builds on previous academic work in the area of political

communication, contributing an assessment of electoral professionalism at the 2004
federal election. Electoral professionalism, a term coined nearly two decades ago, can
be applied to many new developments in 21 81 century campaigning. It is important to
highlight the extent to which Australia's two major parties act as electoral professionals
because of the impact such practice has on representation and the delivery of
governance. The adoption of the electoral professional model is a world wide trend from
which the Australian political system is not immune. Mills (1986) was the first academic
to discuss the influence of American campaign techniques on the professionalisation of
Australian political practice. Ward (1991) demonstrated how the professionalisation of
politics has led to a change in the organisational structure of Australia's two major
parties. Several Australian academics including (van Onselen and Errington 2004 and
2005, Ward 2003 and Young 2002 and 2004) have published works on specific aspects
of electoral professionalism including political databases, the public relations state and
political advertising. This thesis examines the extent to which these political practices
were prevalent during the 2004 election. This thesis describes and analyses these
techniques at work in the last election, an area of study missing from the academic
literature, in order to demonstrate the most recent impact of electoral professionalism on
Australian federal election campaigns.
METHODOLOGY:
A wide range of resources were consulted for information regarding electoral

professionalism and its prevalence during the 2004 federal election. Sources included
academic books, journal articles, political speeches, newspaper articles and opinion
pieces, parliamentary reports including committee findings and election data. To
establish the prevalence of electoral professionalism during the 2004 federal election a
newspaper review of three major Australian newspapers was conducted. The
newspapers included The Australian, The Australian Financial Review and The Sydney
Morning Herald (See Appendix B). These were used to demonstrate specific events

2

within the campaign that highlighted electoral professionalism and have been referred to
throughout this dissertation. Reports by the Australian Electoral Commission provided
useful data on the 2004 federal election campaign. By triangulating the research the
author has been able to establish the professional techniques used by the major parties,
how significant they were to each campaign and most significantly how electoral
professionalism has developed from previous campaigns. In this way this dissertation
makes a substantial contribution to the literature on electoral professionalism. The
author has also obtained important party materials relevant to campaigning. These
materials, contained in the Appendices, have been useful in evaluating the extent to
which parties are embracing new techniques and technologies for campaigning
purposes.
FINDINGS:
Electoral professionalism has become an integral part of Australian political

practice. Growing partisan dealignment and changes to political technology have made
political decision

making

increasingly complex.

Political parties

have become

increasingly dependent upon campaign professionals to develop and operate political
technology, particularly given declining party memberships. This has afforded campaign
professionals an influential role within political parties as they have become the link
between the party and the electorate. As a result campaign professionals have come to
dominate political parties. The most significant aspect of electoral professionalism has
been the shift from mass party to electoral professional party. This has altered the way in
which political parties engage the electorate. and has resulted in a reduction in
ideological outlook and a decline in grassroots membership.
The 2004 federal election result meant that the Howard government was
returned to office for a fourth term. The election was largely fought through the media
and demonstrated the extent to which political information is now packaged in a format
that is suitable for media consumption. This led the major parties to intensify their efforts
to limit scrutiny of key policy announcements and to package complex political
messages in ways that could be easily understood by voters. The 2004 election saw
electronic telephone messaging and email used as new ways in which packaged political
messages were delivered to voters.

3

Electoral professionalism lias seen incumbent governments harness the tools of
government for partisan purposes. The use of the public relations (PR) state intensified
during the 2004 election with the government increasingly merging government
communication with party campaign strategy. The 2004 election also saw the PR state
harnessed to challenge the caretaker government convention. This resulted in the
implementation of government advertising campaigns during the campaign period. The
concept of the PR state will be explored in Chapter Three.
The permanent campaign has emerged as a feature of Australian election
campaigns. During the 2004 election the formal campaign was preceded by a period in
which both the government and opposition's political practice was dictated strongly by
campaign strategies rather than traditional strategies of governance and accountability.
This saw the major parties intensify their efforts to secure private donations and public
funding to pay for the increased cost of campaigning over longer periods. Incumbent
MPs are increasingly using parliamentary entitlements for campaigning purposes. During
the 2004 election a large amount of direct mail was distributed using parliamentary
entitlements. This amounted to a significant campaigning tool for incumbent MPs that
challengers were not able to match.

Chapter

One

CHAPTER OUTLINE:
introduces electoral professionalism

as

a

process

of

professionalisation that has developed over recent decades. Since the 'It's Time'
campaign electoral professionalism has manifested itself in several different ways within
Australian democracy. It has seen access to political information become highly
controlled. The length of campaign periods stretch out longer and longer. It has also
seen executive government increasingly coordinate the political messages that all arms
of government convey to the public. Electoral professionalism has led the major parties
to increasingly rely on political technology. As a result the cost of campaigning has risen
dramatically leading the major parties to seek out increased funding. In many instances
this entrenches the major parties electoral dominance within the Australian political
system.

Chapter Two demonstrates how growing partisan dealignment and the
development of new political technologies have caused political parties to become

4

dependent on campaign professionals. Campaign professionals have come to dominate
political parties. This chapter outlines the significant organisational changes that
Australia's major parties have undergone to accommodate this development. As a result
the major parties have reduced their ideological focus and created numerous
disincentives for the increasingly unwanted and unneeded grassroots members.

Chapter Three applies electoral professional theory to the 2004 federal election.
The election saw an intensification of existing campaign techniques and the
implementation of new techniques. The major parties intensified their efforts to package
political information. This led to greater secrecy surrounding policy announcements and
greater attempts to package complex political messages. During the 2004 election the
PR state was harnessed to challenge the caretaker government convention and mount
government advertising campaigns during the campaign period. The election also saw
the emergence of the permanent campaign in Australia. As a result the major parties
intensified their efforts to secure funding to pay for increases in campaign expenditure.
Chapter Three presents an important set of findings regarding the ongoing intensification
of political campaigning, and applies findings to Panebianco's Electoral-Professional
party model.

5

CHAPTER 1: ELECTORAL PROFESSIONALISM
UNDERSTANDING THE ELECTORAL PROFESSIONAL MODEL:
Electoral professionalism explains both the changing organisational structure of

political parties and changes to the way parties engage with the electorate. In his study
of electoral professionalism, Panebianco (1988, 231-2) identified professionalisation as a
common feature of organisational change that political parties undergo; it implied the
decreasing importance of the old bureaucracy and the increasing importance of
campaign professionals. Professionalisation has altered the way political parties function
by changing their organisational structure. An electoral professional party has a reduced
ideological focus and provides a greater role for campaign professionals, often at the
expense of party members (Panebianco 1988, 264). The development of electoral
professionalism has enabled political parties to adapt to a changing political
environment. In a social climate conducive to partisan de-alignment, the preparedness of
Australia's major political parties to adapt their organisation, strategy and policies has
enabled them to remain competitive (Bean 1996, 136). The major parties have
undergone significant organisational changes in recent years as their focus has shifted
from party members to the electorate.
As a result of moves towards electoral professionalism the major parties have
been experiencing a shrinking grassroots membership (Jaensch, Brent and Bowden
2005, 54, Jaensch 2006, 28, Johns 2006, 47 and Ward 1991, 153 and 2006, 73). A
reduced ideological outlook and the increased infiltration of campaign professionals has
aided in this process. It is estimated that the

La~or

Party had 370,000 branch members

in 1939, fell to 56,000 by 1973 and had declined to 50,000 by the mid 1990s (Jaensch,
Brent and Bowden 2005, 52 and Jaensch 2006, 28). The Liberal Party's membership,
estimated at 220,000 in the early 1950s, fell to around 100,000 by 1984 and to 70,000 in
the late 1990s (Jaensch, Brent and Bowden 2005, 52 and Jaensch 2006, 28). 2 Political
parties once so dependent upon party members are no longer reliant on a large and
active membership base for electoral success (Jaensch, Brent and Bowden 2005, 59,
Jaensch 2006, 30, Marsh 2006, 8, Ward 2006, 75, and Young 2004, 109). The decline of
the major parties membership numbers has been eased by the influx of campaign
2

According to Jaensch, Brent and Bowden (2005, 52) Australian political parties are under no obligation to release party
membership numbers and generally. keep them secret. However, it is estimated that membership of Australian political
parties fell from four percent of the total population in the 1960s to less than two percent in the late 1990s (Jaensch, Brent
and Bowden 2005, 54).
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professionals who are equipped with the skills necessary in an era of electoral
professionalism.
Party members have become less important due to changes to political
communication and the professionalisation of election campaigns. According to Mills
(1986, 2) the drive towards professional electioneering began in Australia with Don
Dunstan's 1967-68 re-election campaign for South Australian Premier. This campaign
used sophisticated market research and extensive television advertising. This marked a
shift from the traditional way in which campaigns were conducted in Australia. The
Dunstan campaign made a concerted effort to gauge the opinions of the electorate
through the use of market research whilst also sidelining the party machine due to its
suspicion of such techniques (Blewett and Jaensch 1971, 59-60 and 65). These
techniques were replicated at a federal level in 1972 by the ALP in the historic 'It's Time'
campaign. Mills (1986: 2) argues that the " ... success of this campaign institutionalised
market research and mass TV advertising into Australian political practice". Similar to the
Dunstan campaign four years earlier, the 'It's Time' campaign embarked on gauging
public opinion and a continuous publicity campaign to sell its image to the electorate.
The 'It's Time' campaign demonstrated not only the changing nature of campaigning, but
also the increasing professionalisation of the Australian Labor Party.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTORAL PROFESSIONALISM:
As Australia's two major parties have become electorally professional, access to

political information has become highly controlled by politicians and parties. Franklin
(1994) outlin~d the tendency of political parties and in particular governments to attempt
to shape the way in which the media reports politics. This is an attempt to use the media
to influence voter behaviour. Politicians and political parties increasingly seek to manage
and control public representations of politics through media advisers (Street 2001, 185).
Media advisers have become crucial to the way political parties and politicians manage
3

the media. The result of this is that political information is being manipulated to adhere
to the political aims of those presenting it. This has resulted in the creation of highly
scripted events that enable politicians and parties to sell political messages by
harnessing the power of the mass media. Therefore the " ... media no longer simply offer
3

Political parties have recruited armies of media advisers in order to develop strategies for promoting electorally
favourable media images of their leaders and key policies (Franklin 1994, 6).
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the public information about political affairs, but are increasingly being managed by
politicians in ways that allow them undue and improper influence over voters choices"
(Franklin 1994, 13). The desire of parties and politicians to exert greater control over the
political messages that they present to the public is most obvious during election
campaigns.
.
. dswh"IC h way t ovote
Tabl e 11 When vot ers rna d e up th e1rmm
Along time ago
Before the election was announced
When the election was announced
During the campaign (including polling day)
On polling day itself

1987

1990

1993

1996

1998

2001

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

50.0
23.0

45.9
10.7
7.7
35.8
9.9

42.4
13.2
6.7
37.7
7.9

49.9
12.1
6.6
31.4
10.7

35.3
13.6
9.0
42.8
11.3

44.8
13.8
6.8
34.6
12.3

46.9
14.3
6.5
32.4
8.6

n.a.

26.0
n.a.

2004

Source: Ward (2005, 4).

Electoral professionalism is also characterised by the way in which campaigning
has become a continuous process that lacks a definite beginning and end. 4 The actual
election campaign has become no more than an intensification or culmination of a
campaigning process that has extended over months or years (Mills 1986, 11 0). The
period where both parties begin campaigning before the announcement of an election
date is stretching out longer and longer (Young 2004, 7). The 2004 election
demonstrated the extent to which both major parties seek to shape voters perceptions
about politics in the period leading up to an election campaign. Table 1.1 demonstrates
that the majority of voters decide which way they will vote well before the campaign. 5
Therefore the official campaign period is used by .Parties to reinforce rather than change
people's perceptions about politics (van Onselen and Errington 2005a, 4). As a result
there has been an increasing tendency to use campaign techniques in the process of
governing in order to influence voter behaviour. Mann and Ornstein (2000, 219) argue
that this has caused the process of campaigning and the process of governing to lose
their distinctiveness. This has created greater incumbency advantage to sitting MPs
because they are able to use the provision of resources by the state for campaigning
purposes.
4

Kelly (2006, 6 and 11) argues that a key innovation of the Howard government has been the fact that Howard
~ampaigns on behalf of his government each and every day.

Although the number of voters deciding which way they will vote during the election campaign is on the rise it still only
~mounts to 40 percent of voters. Therefore there are a significant number of people whose voting behaviour can be

Influenced before the campaign period.
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The blurring of the line between the process of campaigning and the process of
governing provides numerous advantages to incumbent governments. This is because
governments are able to use public relations techniques to influence policy debates.
Governments coordinate the use of public relations techniques throughout the
machinery of government in an effort to seek partisan advantage (van Onselen and
Errington 2005a, 2). This enables governments to better promote themselves and their
policies. Governments routinely employ armies of media advisers and communications
experts in order to promote themselves, their policies and their interests over that of the
opposition (Young 2004, 77). Ward (2003) sought to examine the institutional framework
that allows governments to coordinate and implement campaigns intended to steer, or
manage, policy debates. According to Ward (2003) there are four main categories,
including media advisers, media units, departmental public affairs sections and a whole
of government approach that enable governments to better influence policy debates. It is
essentially an attempt by executive government to coordinate the political messages that
all arms of government convey to the public.
THE IMPACT OF ELECTORAL PROFESSIONALISM IN AUSTRLIA:
The adoption of electoral professionalism by the major parties has increased the

need to develop more efficient and effective ways of communicating with the electorate.
This has resulted in an increasing reliance on campaign professionals and political
technology. 6 The dynamics of the major parties have changed so that they are open to
the importation of political technology from overseas (Weller and Young 2000, 157). The
hiring of campaign professionals and the technology that they operate is expensive and
has led to increasing campaign costs. This is because the acquisition of votes through
political technology is a capital intensive, rather than a labour intensive exercise (Kobrak
2002, 110 and Ward 2006, 75). The fact that campaigns are highly competitive events
and conducted over longer periods only serves to hasten the readiness of political
parties to spend increasing amounts of money. Ward (2005) outlines the way in which
Australia's two major parties routinely employ campaign professionals and political
technology in order to communicate with voters during election campaigns. This
demonstrates that only an electoral professional party can manage the more intense
campaign methods of modern politics. Ward (2005) outlines the central role that
6

Political " ... parties have become much more reliant upon marketers, pollsters, software designers and direct. mail,
advertising and public relations specialists - upon professionals with skills in persuasive communication" (Ward 2006, 789).
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campaign professional's advice plays in shaping election campaign strategy. This fits
Panebianco's (1988, 264) model for an electoral professional party and demonstrates
the extent to which Australia's two major parties conform to the electoral professional
model of party.
The adoption of electoral professionalism has led the major parties to intensify
their efforts to secure private donations and public funding. These funds pay for the
increased cost of campaigning over longer periods. In an era of electoral professionalism
the major parties have sought to use parliamentary entitlements for campaigning
purposes. The major parties tend to rely on resources provided by the parliament to
members to fund national and local campaigns (van Onselen and Errington 2005b, 22).
This provides the major parties with significant resource advantages that minor parties
and independents cannot match. This is symptomatic of what Mair and Katz (1997) call
cartel theory, whereby major political parties rely on the provision of resources by the
state to maintain their existing electoral dominance. Australia's two major parties have
shown a willingness to legislate to maintain and extend incumbency advantage and
entrench the two-party system (See Young and Tham 2006). According to Mair and Katz
(1997, 107-8) cartel parties are integrated into the state apparatus and collude with
ostensibly competing parties to maintain their electoral dominance and to exclude new
parties. The ongoing professionalisation of party activity in Australia means that those
that can utilise the resources afforded to them for campaigning purposes are better able
to compete in an era of electoral professionalism.

It is ·important to outline the changes that are occurring within Australian
democracy. The ongoing professionalisation of Australian political practice has had a
major impact on the organisational structure of the major parties and on the way that
they engage with the electorate. Electoral professionalism has manifested itself in
several different ways within Australian democracy. Each has had a profound impact on
representation and the delivery of governance. The 2004 election demonstrated the
extent to which the electoral professional model governs the way in which the major
parties engage the electorate. The following chapter will examine the changes within
Australia's major parties, and how these changes help to facilitate an electoral
professional approach.

10

CHAPTER2:
CHANGES WITHIN AUSTRALIA'S MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES:

Electoral professionalism has altered the way in which political parties operate
within Australian democracy. The changing political environment caused by growing
partisan dealignment has created conditions in which political parties have become
increasingly dependent upon campaign professionals. Changes in social stratification
and to political technology have made political decision making increasingly complex.
Campaign professionals provide the skills necessary for political parties to adapt to this
changing political environment. The result of this is that campaign professionals have
come to dominate political parties. Their influence has grown as their reputation for
tracking and targeting the electorate increases. The influx of campaign professionals has
also altered the organisational structure of political parties. The most significant change
has been the shift from mass party to electoral professional party, alluded to in the
previous chapter. Electoral professional parties create numerous disincentives for party
members because electoral success is no longer bound by a strong party membership.
THE INCREASING COMPLEXITIES OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING:
Political parties have become electoral professionals in response to the

increasing complexities of political decision making. One such complexity is the growing
dealignment within the electorate. 7 Electorates have become more socially and culturally
heterogeneous and less controllable by parties (Panebianco 1988, 266). The social
cleavages that political parties once represented have become increasingly diffuse. 8
Bean (1996, 136) argues that this " ... suggests that social structure- in particular social
class which in the past played such a central ro'le in shaping party preference in many
nations- is becoming decreasingly relevant to political choice, in the wake of massive
social change". This has affected political parties by altering the way in which political
issues are formed within the electorate. 9 The 2004 federal election presented a set of
electors not wedded to either side of politics. For this reason the number of swinging
voters was high and the major parties needed to compete to claim the majority of this

7

Dealignment is characterised by an erosion of traditional ties of party and class loyalty (Street 2001, 195).
Social cleavages are divisions within society, such as race, class, religion, language, ethnicity, region & culture that
differentiate groups of people ( Jaensch 1983, 45).

8
9

'

Smith (1997, 165) argues that the Labor Party has had to deal with increasing numbers of workers in 'middle class' and
non-unionised jobs. For the Liberal Party the problem has been to balance business aspirations with those of its other
supporters.
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voting cohort. We therefore saw new and emerging techniques, as well as more
professional practice of existing campaign techniques.
Political parties must now appeal to a wide segment of society whose interests
are not as clearly defined as they once were. The changing nature of political parties is
aimed at addressing the increasing social complexity caused by the breakdown of
traditional political alignments (Street 2001, 193). Growing dealignment has created
conditions in which political parties and politicians must sell themselves to the electorate.
This is because a greater ambiguity in class identity has weakened partisanship
(Kavanagh 1995, 23). The result of this is that the ideological aims of a party have
become less of an issue to voters, who are now interested in other things that a party
can offer. Therefore a person's vote is generally dictated by their perceptions of
individual policies rather than traditional ideological or class based ties with particular
parties. Political parties have responded to the growing complexities of political decision
making by seeking out new methods of communicating with the electorate.
Changes to political communication have also resulted in the increased
complexity of political decision making. Panebianco (1988, 266) argues that changes in
communication techniques have caused an earthquake in party organisations by making
old bureaucratic roles obsolete and changing the terms of political communication.
Technology has become the key to communicating political messages to voters. "With
TV the dominant means of political communication; with an increasing emphasis on
surveys and direct mail; with the explosion of technology, parties are increasingly
'electoral professional"' (Jaensch 2006, 28). It has become increasingly important for
political parties to harness these techniques in order to sell political messages to voters.
Swanson and Mancini (1996, 251) argue that "... when the fortunes of political parties
rest on opinion rather than membership and historical allegiances, the means for
cultivating and shaping public opinion becomes crucial to electoral success". Political
parties have turned to campaign professionals in order to effectively use political
technology. This has facilitated a rise in the number of campaign professionals, who in
turn have made politicians increasingly dependent upon them (Kavanagh 1995, 10).

The skills that campaign professionals provide enable political parties to compete
in a changing political environment. Growing partisan dealignment has created
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conditions in which an increasing number of voters have no political allegiance (See
Figure 2.1) Compulsory voting compels all Australian's over the age of eighteen to vote,
or at least have their name marked off the electoral role at a polling station. This
relatively unique aspect of Australian electoral law means that political parties are freed
from turning out voters and are largely assured the votes of their core supporters. As a
result political parties can concentrate on isolating and communicating with swinging,
undecided and soft voters in order to build a relationship with them that will influence
their voting behaviour (Crosby 1996, 162). These voters are crucial in determining which
party will form government and campaign professionals provide the means to track and
target them. 10 The research that is conducted by campaign professionals is intended to
provide an insight into the concerns of voters. This allows political parties to pitch
policies and party image at parts of the electorate where it will be most effectively
received. The process of tracking and targeting has become a crucial aspect of electoral
professionalism and a major reason why political parties are so dependent upon
campaign professionals.
Figure 2.1 Always vote for the same party
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CAMPAIGN PROFESSIONALS:
'Campaign professional' is a term that encapsulates a wide variety of

professionals that are integral to the way that politics now operates in Australia. These
10 M"l
11 s (1986, 8) argues that tracking. refers to the research conducted by pollsters that enables parties to listen to the
electorate. Targeting refers to the communication that takes place based on the findings of the research, allowing parties
to speak to the electorate.
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'experts' are people who have traditionally operated in the commercial world or have
been trained through long term party involvement. In the case of commercially trained
persons, they have been integrated into Australian political parties with much ease. 11
Campaign professionals are skilled in areas such as polling, marketing, media
management, computer technologies, direct mail technics and public relations.
Internationally academics have discussed the role that campaign professionals play
within both British and US democracy respectively (Kavanagh 1995 and Mann and
Ornstein 2000). The term campaign professional has been less documented within its
Australian context. Therefore it is important to outline how campaign professionals
operate in Australia and where they are found within the political system. This is
important because there are a growing number of hidden campaign professionals that
operate for the benefit of the incumbent government (Ward 2006, 81).

FIGURE 2.2 INCREASES IN MINISTERIAL STAFF
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In Australia campaign professionals can be grouped into three categories;
ministerial staff, party organisational staff and consultants. A growing number of
campaign professionals are being employed as ministerial staff and are payed for by the
taxpayer. The number of ministerial staff has grown in line with the increasing demands
placed upon ministers and the creation of new ministerial positions (Grattan 1998, 35
II Young (2004, 63) argues that the key areas of political power brokers today are journalism, marketing, communications
and PR.

14

and Holland 2002) (See Figure i2). 12 These campaign professionals are employed by
government and provide ministers with a greater ability to develop and promote policy.
This has enabled the parliamentary leadership to assume an increasingly dominant role
over the other sections of party as well as the opposition (Jaensch 2006, 32-3 and Ward

2006, 81 and 87). The second form of campaign professionals are those who work
within the state and federal secretariats' of the major parties. Their numbers are not
large and they are generally concerned with campaigning, fundraising and managing
preselections. It is these types of professionals that tend to be committed partisans'
working for certain factions within the party (See Page 2006). The third type of campaign
professional is the consultant who comes into the party in the form of pollsters, image
consultants and advertising consultants. Some are hired around the clock and can form
part of the party leadership (Tiffen 1989, 138), whilst others are hired during election
campaigns. The Liberal Party hires several advertising consultants known as 'the team'
to develop political advertisements for election campaigns (See Young 2004, 97-9). The
drive towards electoral professionalism has elevated these campaign professionals to
dominant positions within the major parties.
THE DOMINANT ROLE OF CAMPAIGN PROFESSIONALS:
The increasing dependence of political parties on campaign professionals has

enabled them to dominate parties. This is because they provide the expert knowledge
that is required to use political technology effectively. The old methods of going door to
door and talking face to face with voters have been replaced with telephone, mail and
Internet methods that are contracted out to campaign professionals (Jaensch 2006, 36
and Luntz 1~88, 41 ). The result is that important decisions that the major parties make
are increasingly being managed by campaign professionals in conjunction with other
party elites. Jaensch (2006, 41) argues that the major parties have vested increasing
power over policy-making, over intra-party relations, and over election campaigning, to
party elites and campaign professionals. This has occurred because the advice that
campaign professionals provide is seen as having real electioneering value. This has
elevated their status within the party and enabled them to have a dominate role in
determining the direction that the party takes.
12

The number of ministerial staff has at least doubled in the last thirty years, but this growth has been steady and not the
product of a sudden explosion (Holland 2002). It is estimated that the Howard government currently employs 385
ministerial staff (Ward 2006, 81).
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Modern society is characterised by the increased distance between political
parties and citizens. During the 2004 federal election only 2.5 percent of voters regularly
or occasionally attended any political meetings or rallies (Ward 2005, 3). A total of 71.2
percent of voters reported having no contact with any party or candidate during the
campaign (Ward 2005, 3). In this environment political advertising has become a vital
means of communication between political actor and citizen, particularly television
advertising. During the 2004 election the major parties devoted sixty percent of their
respective advertising budgets to television advertising (Miskin and Grant 2004). 13
Political advertising is used to sell politicians and parties to voters, but in an era of
electoral professionalism, political advertising is increasingly negative. Negative ads are
those which do not focus on the positive attributes of the party that has paid for the ad,
but are ones that focus on the alleged weaknesses of the other party or its leader
(McNair 1995, 94). Negative advertising has become more prevalent because political
parties view it as the only vehicle they are able to use to grab the attention of swinging
voters (See Mills 1986 and Young 2004). 14
Campaign professionals also provide the expertise to effectively manage the
media. Political parties invest much time and effort in attempting to shape the news
coverage of political events. The battle for the 'free' media is borne out of the belief that
news coverage is more authentic than paid political advertising. Whilst paid advertising
is clearly partisan the " ... lack of control and apparent spontaneity of most free media
scenarios heightens believability" (McNair 1995, 111). Therefore a candidate's ability to
win the battle for the 'free' media enables their

~essage

to be filtered through journalists

to citizens. Ward (2005, 18) argues that parties " ... approach campaigns as contests to
control the way televised political news is reported, and thus the way in which issues are
framed and understood". The 'free' media is not only cheaper than paid political
advertising, but it is also seen as more effective because the messages that the media
relay are not viewed in the same partisan manner. It is, however, fraught with danger
because once the media are used to spread a message the candidate loses control over
how that message is presented. Therefore, whilst politicians desire media exposure of
13

However, direct mail is now rivalling television as the preferred method of political communication used by the major
parties (Young 2004, 67).
14
Rod Cameron (cited in JSCEM 1997, 25) ALP pollster during the Hawke and Keating governments, argues that
political advertising must now appeal to the lowest common denominator because it is directed at swinging voters who
would not vote if they were not compelled to do so.
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the more authentic kind, they also strive to reimpose some kind of control over its output
(McNair 1995, 111). To achieve this they have turned to professionals, particularly media
advisers who are trained in the workings of the media (McNair 1995, 111 ).
CHANGING PARTY STRUCTURE IN AUSTRALIA: THE ELECTORAL
PROFESSIONAL PARTY
Political parties were originally formed as a means of representing the interests

of certain sections of society. Political parties have played a key role in mobilising a
mass electorate and linking citizens to government (Marsh 2006, 3). Characterised by
mass mobilisation they represented people's tangible interests; one to represent labour
and the working classes, the other capital and the middle classes (Jaensch, Brent and
Bowden 2005, 52). They represented well defined social cleavages within Australian
society. The people within these social groups were crucial to the sustainability of
Australia's two major parties. Traditionally political parties were " ... sustained by loyal
constituents who pass on their loyalty to subsequent generations" (Jupp 1963, 159).
Therefore, the electoral stability of the two major parties was sustained by their ability to
represent well defined sections of society. This gave them generational support that was
extremely stable and unchanging. However, these divisions are less relevant in modern
Australia. Subsequently Australians are finding fewer reasons to join the major parties
(Jaensch, Brent and Bowden 2005, 52). As a result Australia's major political parties
have altered their organisational structure in order to remain competitive in a changing
political environment.
TABLE 2.1 Characteristics of mass party and electoral professional partv
Mass Bureaucratic Party

Electoral Professional Party

,,

Central role for party bureaucracy (political
administrative tasks).
Strong party membership, strong ties between
party elite and party members, represents
clearly defined social cleavages.
Pre-eminence of internal leaders, collegial
leadership
Financing through membership and collateral
activities (party cooperatives trade union etc.)
Stress on ideology, central role of the believers
within the organisation.

Central role for campaign professionals
(specialised tasks).
Declining party membership, weak ties
between party elite and party members, appeal
to broader society (opinion electorate).
Pre-eminence of the public representatives,
personalised leadership
Financing through interest groups and public
funding.
Stress on issues and leadership, central role of
careerists and representatives of interest
groups within the organisation.

Source: Adapted from Panebranco (1988, 264).
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The adoption of electoral professionalism has altered the organisational structure
of political parties. Mass political parties, characterised by their strong ideology and the
central role that they provided party members have transformed into electoral
professional parties (See Table 2.1 ). Electoral professional parties are characterised by
their reduced ideology and the larger role that they provide campaign professionals
(Panebianco 1988, 264). Electoral professional parties are geared towards contesting
upcoming election campaigns and have reduced their ideological outlook in response to
changes within the electorate. In an environment where ideology is less conducive to
peoples political choices the major parties have begun to appeal to larger sections of
society. The electoral professional party " ... marked the progressive move of individual
parties away from mass membership and loyal electoral bases towards one that was
contingently constructed from a less ideologically based program" (Marsh 2006, 8). This
has resulted in similarities in policy as the major parties attempt to make broader
appeals to voters in order to maximise their electoral support. The major parties have
had to undergo significant organisational change for them to have reduced their
ideological outlook and become increasingly accommodating of campaign professionals.

FIGURE 2.3 Three Sections of party in Australia
Party Organisation

Party in Government

Officials,
Workers &
Branch
Members

Party
Candidates

&
Officeholders

~

Voters with
loyalty to &
identification
with Party

Party in the Electorate
Source: Ward (1991, 154).

18

The major parties have undergone significant organisational change which has
altered the relationship between the three sections of party. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the
relationship between the three sections of party in Australia. Ward (1991: 154) argues
that examining 'party organisation' is a key to understanding the changes which the
Liberal Party and Labor Party have undergone. The party organisation played a crucial
role in linking the party in government with the party in the electorate. The influx of
campaign professionals has enabled the party in government to bypass the party
organisation and communicate directly with the party in the electorate (Ward 1991, 162).
This has enhanced the power of the party in government over the other sections of
party. Jaensch (2006, 32) describes this as an internal power transfer that has vested
power to the central bodies, in the Liberal Party to the leadership levels and in the Labor
Party to the factions. The party in government has assumed the power to execute policy
decisions and election campaign strategy, roles that were traditionally vested within the
other sections of party. The 2004 election demonstrated the extent to which the
parliamentary leadership is now placed to decide the detail of policy for the wider party
as Mark Latham did for Labor (Ward 2006, 72). These developments have impacted on
the role that party members play within the party.

The role of party members has been reduced in favour of the skills of campaign
professionals. Party members were traditionally an important source of campaign funds
and labour for the major parties (Ward 1991, 159, Young 2004, 110 and Jaensch, Brent
and Bowden 2005, 53). Young (2004, 109) argues that the professionalisation of politics
has meant that party members are often unvyanted, unneeded and excluded from
important party activities, especially in election campaign strategy. Political parties are
less reliant on party members because modern electioneering is no longer dependent
upon a large and active membership base (Jaensch, Brent and Bowden 2005, 59,
Jaensch 2006, 30, Marsh 2006, 8, Ward 2006, 75, and Young 2004, 109). In fact party
members are increasingly being seen as a hindrance to effective campaigning. Even the
functions that the major parties believe that party members are capable of doing, such
as leafleting and handing-out how to vote cards, are being contracted out to private
organisations at an increasing rate (Jaensch 2006, 31). Campaign professionals provide
parties with the skills required to compete in a changed political environment. It is for this
reason that campaign professionals have replaced party members and become the new
link between the party and the electorate.
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CONCLUSION:
Electoral professionalism has altered the way in which political parties operate

within Australian democracy. The changing political environment has created conditions
in which political parties are increasingly dependent on campaign professionals. The
increasing complexities of political decision making have led political parties to adopt the
electoral professional model. Campaign professionals provide the skills necessary for
political parties to adapt to this changing political environment. Campaign professionals
have therefore come to dominate political parties. They now provide the link between the
party and the electorate. The influx of campaign professionals has altered the
organisational structure of political parties. Mass parties, characterised by mass
mobilisation and heavy reliance on grassroots members are now electoral professional
parties. Electoral professional parties are characterised by a reduced ideological focus
and the greater role that they provide for campaign professionals.
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CHAPTER3:
THE 2004 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

On August 29 2004 the Prime Minister announced that an election date of
October 9 had been set. This meant that the 2004 federal election campaign would be
conducted over an extended six-week period. The Coalition only needed to lose the
votes of 3776 people in key marginal seats to fall from power (Young 2004, 43). This
translated into 12 seats to lose government and 8 seats to confront a hung parliament
(The Australian, August 30, 2004). The 2004 federal election shaped up to be a tight

contest in which either party's ability to sell their political message to the electorate
would be crucial in deciding which party would form government. The end result saw the
Howard government returned to office with an increased majority and control of the
Senate (See Appendix A). With the ALP winning just 37.64 percent of the primary vote
the Coalition victory demonstrated Howard's ability to resonate in the mortgage belt
seats of the capital cities (AEC 2005 and The Sydney Morning Herald, October 11,
2004) (See Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Electoral professionalism played a key role in
determining how the major parties engaged the electorate during the 2004 campaign.
The major parties have shown a willingness to develop more efficient and effective ways
of communicating with the electorate (Ward 2005, 6). At the 2004 election this resulted
in an intensification of existing campaign techniques and the development of new
campaign techniques.

During the 2004 election the major parties extended control over the political
messages that they conveyed to the public by packaging political information. This led
the major parties to intensify their efforts to limit scrutiny of key policy announcements
and to package complex political messages in ways that could be easily understood by
voters. The 2004 election saw the emergence of telephone messaging and email as new
means of delivering packaged political messages to Australian voters. The public
relations (PR) state also emerged as a greater campaign weapon for incumbent
governments. The use of ministerial staff to aid party campaign strategy and the merging
of government communication with wider party campaign strategy intensified. The 2004
election saw the PR state extended to challenge the caretaker government convention
and mount government advertising campaigns during the formal campaign period. The
election also marked the intensification of the permanent campaign, as discussed by
Mann and Ornstein (2000). This led to an extended campaign period in which the focus
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of both the government and opposition was on campaigning rather than traditional roles
of governance and accountability. The extended length of campaigning intensified the
major parties' efforts to secure funding to pay for increases in campaign expenditure.
This resulted in MPs using parliamentary entitlements for campaigning purposes,
including direct mail.

TABLE 3.1 PRIMARY VOTE 2004 FEDERAL ELECTION
Political Party

House of Reps.

HORswing

+3.39%
Liberal Party
40.47%
-0.20%
Labor Party
37.64%
Liberal/National
+0.28%
Nationals
5.89%
+2.23
Greens
7.19%
1.24%
-4.17
Democrats
One Nation
1.19%
-3.15
+2.01
Family First
2.01%
Source: adapted from the Australian Electoral Comm1ss1on (2005).

Senate

Senate swing

17.65%
35.02%
25.72%
1.37%
7.67%
2.09%
1.73%
1.76%

+1.96
+0.70
+1.84
-0.55
+3.29
-5.16
-3.81
+1.76

TABLE 3.2 TWO-PARTY PREFERRED VOTE 2004 FEDERAL ELECTION
Political Party

Votes

%

Swing

Coalition

6, 179,130

52.74%

+1.79

Labor Party

5,536,002

47.26%

-1.79

Source: Australian Electoral Comm1ss1on (2005).

PACKAGING POLITICS:
Politicians and parties are aware that the media are heavily dependent upon
them for information. 15 Politicians are able to manipulate the media by exploiting its day
to day work demands (Tiffen 1989, 77). They provide the right information, in the right
format and at the right time of the day. Information is presented to journalists with the
hope that it will be used without being questioned or investigated. 16 Packaging is an
attempt by politicians to use the media's dependency on them to exert control over the
political messages that they convey to the public (Grattan 1998, 34-5). The aim is to set
the ground rules in the politicians favour, enabling them to present their political image
15

Tiffen (1989, 77) cites former QLD premier, Joh Bjelke-Petersen comparing his government's ability to provide
information to needy journalists as 'feeding his chooks' as an example of how some politicians view the relationship
between themselves and journalists.
16
Street (2001, 146-7) argues that ''what appears as a 'news story' can sometimes be nothing more than a minimal
rewrite of a press release".
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as they choose. In this environment television interviews and press conferences have
become vehicles from which politicians can spread their political message rather than be
effectively scrutinised (Street 2001, 188). Packaging also provides politicians and parties
with the ability to sell key political themes and make complex messages understandable.
Political parties have sought to use political marketing techniques to package
themselves for easier public consumption. Beresford (1998, 24) argues that political
marketing " ... is best understood as the adoption of commercial marketing techniques
applied to 'selling' a political party as a product". In this sense citizens are viewed as
consumers who will choose their political allegiances based on how a political party is
marketed.
The packaging of political information is criticised because of the harm it is
perceived to impart upon democracy. Franklin (1994, 9-1 0) argues that "packaging
politics impoverishes political debate by oversimplifying and trivializing political
communications". However, packaging can also be seen as a way in which politicians
and political parties have sought to address the changing political culture in which they
operate. Packaging can be viewed as a rationale way in which parties and candidates
behave in conditions of competitive mass democracy (Scammell 1995, 18-9). Prior to the
2004 election appearances by Opposition Leader Mark Latham on the set of Big Brother
and Treasurer Peter Costello co-hosting the Kerri-Anne show demonstrated the ways in
which politicians seek to present themselves as people just like everyone else (The
Sydney Morning Herald, July 22, 2004). This can serve to bring politics closer to citizens

by engaging people who may have otherwise be.en ambivalent. Packaging can therefore
be seen as the consequence of general cultural shifts within society from which politics
is not immune (Street 2001, 204) (See Chapter 2).
The 2004 election saw the major parties intensify their efforts to package political
information. The secrecy surrounding policy announcements and attempts to make
complex political messages understandable intensified. In modern campaigns it is
common for journalists to be herded onto buses or planes without being informed about
the policy announcement or even where they were going. 17 Prior to Labor's
17

Fonner Howard advisor, Grahame Morris (The Australian, September 30, 2004) argues that past discrepancies by
journalists, such as leaking campaign itineraries to protestors has resulted in such infonnation becoming a closely
guarded secret. Protestors can divert media attention from the policy announcement resulting in the intended message
being lost.
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announcement of its Tasmanian forest policy journalists had taken-off from Sydney
Airport and were well into their flight before they were informed of where they were
heading (The Sydney Morning Herald, October 5, 2004). These new levels of secrecy
serve to restrict a journalist's ability to ask probing questions because they have limited
time to analyse the contents of the policy. This gave Labor the maximum opportunity to
sell its message with little scrutiny in return. The 2004 election was also characterised by
the way in which complex political messages were packaged in formats that voters could
easily understand. In the early weeks of the campaign Mark Latham struggled to
convince the media that interest rates would not rise under a Latham Labor government.
Appendix C shows how Latham moved to neutralise these fears by signing a giant
cardboard guarantee to keep interests rates low (The Australian, September 3, 2004)
Latham's stage managed signature was designed to make the complexities of Labor's
real policy intentions more easily understood by voters. 18 This packaged message was
intended to re-assure voters about Latham's perceived inability to manage the Australian
economy. However, this attempt failed and highlighted the limitations of packaging
political information in this way. Negative advertising was used as a much more effective
means of packaging during the 2004 election.
The packaging of political information also involves attacking the way in which a
political opponent has packaged themselves. It is for this reason that the 2004 election
was characterised by an intensification of negative political advertising. Cameron (The
Australian Financial Review, September 13, 2004) argues that the key political

marketing issues are the credibility of the chief presenter, the credibility of the brand and
the selling of the message. The Liberal Party's negative advertising campaign was
designed to turn Latham into a negative brand proposition by highlighting his
inexperience as well as his alleged inability to manage Australia's economy. The L-plate
mnemonic represented his inexperience and slogans claiming 'that if you can't run a
council, you can't run a country' reinforced doubts about Latham's ability to handle the
Australian economy (The Australian, September 20, 2004 and The Australian, October
7, 2004). 19 Appendix D and E are two examples of the Liberal Party's negative

18

These real policy intentions included a pledge to maintain budget surpluses for the next three years and to be
economically responsible (The Weekend Australian, September 4/5, 2004).
19
The National Party website contained an interest rate calculator that was able to calculate peoples individual monthly
mortgage repayments under the Coalition (7%) and then what they would allegedly rise to under a Labor government
(10% and 12%) (The Sydney Morning Herald, September 6, 2004).
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advertising campaign during the 2004 election. The ALP responded to the Coalition's
negative advertising campaign by attempting to use Peter Costello as a negative brand
proposition. In one advert, a lottery scratchie with the Prime Ministers head on it, is
scratched out to reveal Peter Costello's face underneath (The Weekend Australian

Financial Review, September 25/26 2004) Appendix E contains the Labor Party's
scratchie advertisement. This was designed to force voters to think that a vote for
Howard may in fact be a vote for the less popular Costello. 20 The major parties attempts
to attack the way in which their political opponents had been packaged led to an
intensification of negative political advertising during the 2004 election.

Important weapons in the effort to package political information are the political
databases that occupy the offices of major party MPs. 21 The Coalition database
(Feedback) and the ALP database (Eiectrac) record constituent details allowing a
collation of information in ways useful to political campaigning (van Onselen and
Errington 2005b, 23 and van Onselen 2003, 17). Appendix I outlines how Feedback is
used to record constituent details and the contact that they have with the electoral
offices of MPs. Constituents have a personal profile that consists of 'tags' which can be
updated by electorate office staff (See Appendix J). The stored information is intended to
identify swinging voters in marginal electorates. Targeting swinging voters in marginal
electorates has become the key to much electoral activity (Crosby 1996, 160). Political
databases provide information that enables packaged political messages of varying
kinds, to reach the right voters (See van Onselen 2003, 20). Political databases can
identify which voters to contact about certain issu~s thus maximising the effectiveness of
the message; whilst not harassing voters who have no interest in that particular issue.
Political databases are an important tool in identifying and targeting swinging voters with
packaged political messages. The Coalition database Feedback was instrumental to the
effective implementation of new campaigning techniques during the 2004 election.

Information stored on Feedback provided the email addresses and voting
preferences of constituents. This allowed Liberal candidates to send packaged political
20

In an interesting re-enforcement of the television advertisement the ALP sent a series of matching scratchies to 1
million voters in marginal seats (The Weekend Australian, September 25/26, 2004).
van Onselen and Errington (2005b, 25 and 2004, 351) argue that minor parties, represented only in the Senate, lack
the critical mass of parli1;1mentary resources to run systems as complex as Electrac and Feedback.
21
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messages to them via email. Internationally the internet has become an important
campaigning tool for political parties, especially as means of raising campaign funds and
mobilising large numbers of volunteers (The Sydney Morning Herald, October 9, 2004}. 22
The major parties in Australia have been slow to adopt the internet as a campaigning
tool because they do not need to mobilise large groups of volunteers and are able to use
the provision of resources by the state for partisan purposes. This has seen the internet
emerge as a useful means to deliver packaged political messages to voters. The major
parties websites offer interested voters the opportunity to download policies, sign up for
emailed campaign news, or view selected TV ads (Ward 2005, 15). During the 2004
election the Liberal Party used the Internet to email voters in selected seats. An
exemption provided for parties in the Spam Act, enacted in 2003 allowed emails to be
sent on behalf of Liberal candidates to voters (Ward 2005, 18). Although the
effectiveness of the email campaign is unknown it does enable campaign material to be
sent to voters electronically, thus saving money on printing and postage costs. During
the 2004 election the Internet emerged as a useful medium to deliver packaged political
messages to voters, particularly through email.

Feedback was also instrumental in providing the information on voters, such as
telephone numbers and voting preference that that allowed the Coalition to use
electronic telephone messaging to contact voters in marginal seats. Recorded messages
from John Howard and Peter Costello urged those in marginal seats to vote for their
local Liberal member or candidate (Costar and Browne 2005, 117 and Miskin 2005, 1).
The use of electronic phone messaging in electic;>n campaigns in the US and the UK is
commonplace. Yet, in Australia it is a relatively untapped campaign tool that provides
political parties with several advantages. Miskin (2005, 3) argues that electronic
telephone messaging enables parties to communicate with the electorate as a whole, or
with specific groups without needing large numbers of volunteers to go door-to-door or to
dial telephone numbers. The telephone messaging campaign did create a small media
storm because some calls went to unlisted numbers and to mobile phones. 23 Yet Liberal
22

The Internet fuelled campaign of Howard Dean in the 2004 Democrat Party primaries in the United States mobilised
large groups of supporters or 'Deaniacs' and vast sums of money, around $50 million dollars before the first primary
Fhomas 2004, 6 and 13).
3
This is an example of how political databases can gain information, most likely through constituent contact with an
electoral office that is not widely available and where the person may be unaware that the information has been gathered
(See Appendix I and van Onselen and Errington 2004, 354).
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Party pollster Mark Textor believed that the calls had a positive effect and were
successful in giving people an unfiltered political message (Costar and Browne 2005,
117 and Miskin 2005, 1). The effectiveness of the telephone messaging campaign
remains questionable, but it fits neatly into what parties want to achieve in
professionalised campaigns. That is to communicate with voters using political
technology rather than party members.
THE PUBLIC RELATIONS STATE:
The PR state provides government with significant resource advantages over

oppositions. Governments have numerous resources, including ministerial advisers at
their disposal that can be harnessed for partisan advantage. The 2004 election saw the
use of ministerial advisers for partisan campaigning purposes intensify. Prior to the
election Latham accused lan Hanke, an adviser to Workplace Relations Minister Kevin
Andrews of engaging in dirt digging (The Age, July 8 2004). The accusation made
reference to the fact that whilst lan Hanke was being paid to provide professional advice
to Kevin Andrews he was researching Latham's record as Mayor of Liverpool Council in
the 1990s. 24 This did not concern the Workplace Relations Minister and was intended to
provide the government with ammunition that it could use in its upcoming election
campaign. During the formal campaign period, lan Hanke again performed a function to
aid the Liberal Party. Hanke was tasked with sending SMS messages to journalists in
order to provide them with precise information and lines of questioning towards the
opposition (The Australian, September 9, 2004). This information is provided in the hope
that journalists will use it to pursue the opposition and thus destabilise their campaign.
The partisan role that Hanke played during the 2004 election demonstrates how the use
of ministerial 'advisers for partisan purposes has intensified and become an important
campaign weapon for incumbent governments.

The PR state enables governments to harness media units for partisan
advantage. Media units are funded by the taxpayer and provide government with the
ability to communicate more effectively than their political opponents (Barns 2005, 70).
Successive governments have established media units in order to sell themselves and

24

John Howard defended this as a reasonable and important function of any public servant (The Age, July 8 2004).
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their policies.25 The Howard government established the Government Members
Secretariat (GMS), which plays a key role in coordinating government communication
with party campaign strategy (Errington and van Onselen 2005, 29-34). The GMS
disseminates government information to Coalition MPs. 26 This involves providing training
and advice for the effective operation of Feedback. Appendix K is a confidential letter
written by a staff member at the GMS informing Liberal MPs of the results of a Feedback
stat audit. The letter demonstrates how the GMS aides party campaign strategy by
ensuring that Liberal MPs are using Feedback effectively. During the 2004 election the
use of the GMS to merge government communication with party campaign strategy
intensified. The GMS distributes generic pamphlets which campaign offices personalise
to suit their particular candidate. Appendix L shows a generic pamphlet from the 2004
election that includes the line 'Strengthening Medicare'. This slogan had been used prior
to the campaign in a series of government advertisements. The dissemination of
campaign literature and the inclusion of the line 'Strengthening Medicare' demonstrate
the important role that the GMS played in coordinating government communication with
party campaign strategy during the 2004 election.

FIGURE 3.1 Major Government Advertising Campaigns 1991-2004
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25 The Whitlam government established the Australian Government Liaison Service (AGLS), the Fraser government
established the Government Information Unit (GIU), and the Hawke-Keating government established the National Media
Liaison Service (NMLS) (See Barns 2005).
26 The GMS filters and checks information before it is circulated into the public domain, without actually being the agent of
that information (Errington and van Onselen 2005, 30).
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It has become common for governments to use government advertising for
partisan advantage. 27 In 2004 the government spent $40 million dollars advertising
issues such Medicare, apprenticeships, superannuation, the pharmaceutical benefits
scheme, overseas travel, family payments, the environment, telecommunications and
domestic violence (Young and Tham 2006, 80 and Young 2005, 2). Figure 3.1 provides
an overview of some of the major government advertising campaigns since 1991. The
use of government advertising for partisan advantage intensified prior to the 2004
election. According to the guidelines for government advertising campaigns information
should not be directed at promoting party political interests (n.a 06/12/2005). The
Howard government's $15.7 million dollar advertising campaign for its 'Strengthening
Medicare' policy was roundly criticised because it appeared to advocate government
policy. Criticism emerged because the ads portrayed the government as the defender of
Medicare when in fact it had been focused on scaling Medicare back since coming to
power in 1996 (The Age, June 24, 2004). The PR state enables government to
implement a whole of government approach towards advertising campaigns. This
ensures that all government communications are coordinated towards the government's
overall goals. The establishment of the Ministerial Committee on Government
Communication (MCGC) and the Government Communication Unit (GCU) ensure that
executive government, particularly the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) has increased
oversight over the approval of departmental publicity campaigns (Stewart and Ward
2006, 200-1 and Ward 2003, 10). 28 This means that the approval process for
government advertising is dominated by exec1,1tive government. The 'Strengthening
Medicare' advertising campaign demonstrated that their desire is to promote government
policy and to aid party campaign strategy.

For the 2004 election the government used the PR state to implement
government advertising during the campaign period. This signalled an increasing
willingness to use permanent campaign techniques during the election period. The
public affairs capacities of government departments are used to promote government
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Young (2004, 123-4) argues that the ability of government to run 'public information' campaigns on all manner of issues
has become a political communications resource that governments have sought to abuse, particularly in election years.
28
Executive government gives final· approval to all departmental publicity affairs sections that wish to implement a
publicity campaign (Ward 2003, 10).
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policies. 29 These information units are staffed by public servants and therefore have a
duty to provide a non-partisan public service. 30 However, ministers have increasingly
been able to harness the public affairs capacities of their departments for partisan
purposes (See Weller 2002). The caretaker government convention was challenged at
the 2004 election as government advertising was used during the campaign. The
terrorist bombings in Jakarta saw the government run anti-terrorism advertisements, with
the approval of Labor (Young and Tham 2006, 90). However, after the campaign Labor
withdrew its support claiming that the government did not keep to an agreement and ran
adverts at peak times and during major sporting events (Young and Tham 2006, 90).
The caretaker government convention was further challenged when Centrelink continued
a mail-out through the early stages of the campaign. Centrelink sent a mail-out to 2
million families informing them of a $600 family tax benefit (The Australian Financial
Review, August 31, 2004 and Young and Tham 2006, 90). This meant that the public

affairs capacities of government were continuing to be harnessed during the 2004
election to inform voters of government initiatives, extending permanent campaign
techniques into the federal election period.

THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN:
The 2004 federal election seamlessly followed from an emerging permanent

campaign in Australia. This saw the major parties intensify their campaigning efforts in
the months preceding the announcement of an election date. This was important for
Mark Latham who used this period to introduce himself to the electorate after having
become leader a relatively short time before the election was due. Latham eschewed
traditional political logic by speaking about social issues rather than the economy, as a
means of improving the lives of Australians (Simons 2004, 107). His plainspoken style of
communication and his injection of new ideas into the political arena helped him set the
news agenda. Latham was able to wrong-foot the government on several issues,
including parliamentary superannuation and forced amendments to the US free trade
agreement (van Onselen and Errington 2005a, 7). By contrast Howard struggled to gain
the political initiative and several issues began to put pressure on his government. The
failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq coupled with the resurfacing of the
29

The majority of public service departments have public affairs units which fulfil a necessary public relations role
&Stewart and Ward 2006, 199).
0
According the Australian Public Service Values, public servants are required to be apolitical, performing their functions
in an impartial and professional manner (APS: n.d accessed 30/06/06).
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children overboard allegations from the 2001 election increased the pressure on the
incumbent government (Browne 2005, 7-8). 31 The intensification of campaigning in the
months preceding the announcement of the election enabled Latham to introduce
himself to the electorate and set the political agenda. This placed considerable pressure
on the incumbent government and added to the feeling that the election would be a tight
contest.
FIGURE 3.2 OVERALL CAMPAIGN COSTS 1996-2004
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The 2004 election campaign was conducted over a longer than usual six-week
period. Longer campaign periods have resulted in rising campaign costs as the major
parties spend increasing amounts over longer periods. The 2004 election saw the cost of
campaigning increase significantly on previous years (See Figure 3.2). Rising campaign
costs intensified the major parties' efforts to secure large private donations. Today
private donations amount to more than 80 percent of total funding for the major parties
(JSCEM 2005, 286). As a result a large percentage of MPs time is now spent fundraising
for upcoming elections. Ministers and shadow ministers regularly auction off their time
for large private donations (The Sydney Morning Herald, September 24, 2004). The
increasing need to solicit large private donations has led to an increasing abuse of the
31 The children overboard affair was the claim by the Howard government that a boatload of asylum seekers had thrown
their children overboard in an attempt to force Australian sailors to rescue them and land them on Australian shores
(Weller 2002, 1). This claim was repeated by the government during the 2001 election even though many within
government were aware the claims were false.
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financial disclosure scheme. 32 During the 2004 election the Liberal Party received a one
million dollar private donation that was not disclosed until sixteen months after the
campaign (The Canberra Times, March 27, 2006). Recent amendments to the Electoral
Act increasing the disclosure threshold from $1500 to $10,000 mean that a higher
proportion of political donations will be hidden from public scrutiny. 33 A single donor is
now able to donate $10,000 to a party's state, territory and federal bodies, a total of
$90,000 and still remain anonymous (Tham 2006, 14). The onset of the permanent
campaign has intensified the efforts of the major parties to solicit larger private donations
and to do so with limited scrutiny.
Figure 3.3 Public funding payments 1984-2004
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Longer campaign periods have intensified the major parties attempts to secure
public funds to pay for increases in campaign expenditure. 34 Levels of public funding
have risen in line with increases in campaign expenditure, reaching $42 million during
the 2004 election (See Figure 3.3). Public funding provides the major parties with
several campaigning advantages. The allocation of public funding is based on past
electoral success and therefore allocates significant funding to the major parties
compared to independents and minor parties. During the 2004 federal election the major

32 The financial disclosure scheme was established to inform the public of major sources of party and candidate funding

~~~it!~n°~~;~~~s significant donations to be reported quarterly, whilst Canada limits individual donations to $6,000 per
annum (The Canberra Times , 27 March 2006 & Tham , 2006: 14).

34 The public funding system was established to support parties by weaning them from private donations as well as

creating healthier parties better able to devote resources to policy development (Orr 2004, 66).
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parties received a combined $34,666,369.91 in public funding whilst minor parties such
as the Greens received only $3,316,702.48 (AEC 2005, 4 and AEC 06/09/05) (See
Figure 3.4). Young (2002, 90) argues that levels of public funding are strongly linked with
political party expenditure on advertising. Therefore, the major parties are able to use
public funding as a means of implementing sustained advertising campaigns which the
minor parties are unable to replicate. The major parties also use public funding as a
means of paying for the majority of party campaign activity. During the 2004 election the
major parties delayed the launches of their official campaigns, allowing them to claim
travel and staff costs until the last week of the campaign period (Ward 2006, 82). The
2004 election saw the major parties intensify their efforts to secure public funding as a
means of paying for the increased cost of campaigning over longer periods. This
provided the major parties with significant resource advantages over minor parties and
independents.

Figure 3.4 Public Funding Levels 1996-2004
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MP's distributed a large amount of direct mail using parliamentary entitlements in
2004. Parliamentarians receive a number of support services to help them perform their
duties including salaries and allowances, support staff, an office, equipment, postage,
printing costs and travel entitlements (Costar and Browne 2005, 113, Johns 2006, 55
and Young and Tham 2006, 52). In an era of the permanent campaign MPs have
become inclined to use these entitlements for campaigning purposes for the duration of
their term. Recent legislation allocated MPs $125,000 per annum in printing entitlements
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for the printing of direct mail (Young and Tham 2006, 58-9). 35 During the 2004 election
these entitlements helped to fund the $6,000,000 that each major party spent on direct
mail (JSCEM 2005, 298). This was a significant increase on previous elections with the
total of all direct mail at the 1996 election being $5,490,735.45 (AEC 1996). 36 Direct mail
has become an increasingly important campaigning tool because it can be targeted to a
single street, enabling the candidate to make an extremely personalised pitch on the
issues and themes that they believe will have the greatest impact on their recipients
(Luntz 1988, 156 and Young 2004, 68-9). 37 Challenging candidates are unable to use
parliamentary entitlements to target the electorate in such a precise manner and must
therefore canvass larger portions of the electorate. The use of parliamentary
entitlements to pay for direct mail provided incumbent MPs with a powerful taxpayer
funded campaigning tool at the 2004 election. 38
CONCLUSION:
The 2004 election demonstrated the degree to which electoral professionalism

governs the way the major parties engage the electorate. The 2004 election saw an
intensification of existing campaign techniques and the implementation of new campaign
techniques. The major parties extended control over the political messages that they
conveyed to the public. This resulted in greater secrecy surrounding key policy
announcements and an intensification in the packaging of complex political messages.
The use of negative political advertisements intensified as the major parties attacked the
way in which their political opponents had been packaged. The 2004 election saw
electronic telephone messaging and email used as new means of delivering packaged
political messages to Australian voters. The PR state became an important campaigning
weapon for the incumbent government. The use of ministerial advisers and government
advertising for partisan purposes intensified. As did the use of government media units
to merge government communication with party campaign strategy. The PR state was
also used to challenge the caretaker government convention. This saw the government
35

The $125,000 in printing entitlements was subsequently boosted by postage entitlements of 50 cents per constituent in
2005, thus covering both the cost of producing direct mail and the cost of postage (Young and Tham 2006, 58-9).
36
The 1996 election was last election in which the AEC provided a concise breakdown of the expenditure of parties and
candidates. Therefore since 1996 it has been difficult to gauge spending on individual advertising methods, but increases
in public funding demonstrate that the parties are spending more. Particularly given that public funding constitutes such a
small proportion of the major parties election expenditure.
37
During the 2004 election one MP described direct mail as the Rolls-Royce form of voter contact (Miskin 2005, 3).
38
The significant advantages of incumbency were evident in the fact that only 6 percent of silting members lost their
seats in parliament at the 2004 election (Costar and Browne 2005, 113).
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implement government advertising campaigns during the 2004 election to inform voters
of government initiatives. The permanent campaign also emerged as a feature of
Australian election campaigns. The permanent campaign intensified the major parties
efforts to secure larger private donations and increased public funding. Rising campaign
costs caused by the extended length of campaigning resulted in MPs using
parliamentary entitlements for campaigning purposes. As a result a large amount of
direct mail was distributed using parliamentary entitlements. This gave incumbent MPs a
significant campaigning weapon that challengers were unable to replicate.
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. CONCLUSION:
Elections are the process through which citizens provide elected representatives

with a mandate to govern. Swanson and Mancini (1996, 247) argue that "electoral
practices are one of the fundamental forms through which democratic societies
constitute and express their nature ... ". The 2004 election saw electoral professionalism
strongly dictate the way in which the major parties engaged the electorate. Ward (1991)
was the first Australian political scientist to systematically apply the electoral professional
model of party to Australia's major parties. The major parties have undergone significant
organisational change in recent years. A key indicator that both the major parties have
become electoral professionals is their declining party membership numbers. Electoral
professionalism has manifested itself in several different ways within Australian
democracy. It has seen access to political information become highly controlled by
politicians and parties. Electoral professional parties seek to exert control over the
political messages that they convey to the public. Electoral professionalism has also
caused campaigning to become a continuous process which lacks a definite beginning
and end, but involves a clear intensification closer to election day. This has created
greater incumbency advantages for sitting MPs because they are able to use the
resources of the state for campaigning purposes. This has led to an increasing use of
campaign techniques in the process of governing as governments have sought to use
public relations techniques to influence policy debates.

Political parties were originally formed as a means of representing the interests
of certain sections of society. Australia's two major parties have become electoral
professional parties with a more influential role for campaign professionals. The
transformation from mass party to electoral professional party has altered the way in
which the two major parties approach the electorate. This has also led to a reduced
ideological outlook and less reliance on a large and active membership. The result of
this is that political parties have become increasingly dependent upon campaign
professionals. The skills and expertise that campaign professionals provide political
parties with enables them to compete in a changing political environment. Campaign
professionals have begun to dominate political parties as their reputation for tracking and
targeting the electorate has grown. Campaign professionals enable political parties to
communicate their political messages more effectively and the research that they
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conduct has been influential in mapping out the major parties understanding of the
electorate.

The 2004 federal election saw the Howard government returned to office for a
fourth term. The campaign displayed many of the characteristics of electoral
professionalism. There was an intensification of existing campaign techniques and the
implementation of new campaign techniques. The major parties extended their efforts to
package political information and to exert control over the political messages that they
conveyed to the public. Electronic telephone messaging and email became new means
of delivering packaged political messages to voters. The use of ministerial advisers and
government advertising for partisan political purposes intensified. Government media
units were also used to merge government communication with party campaign strategy.
The PR state was harnessed during the 2004 election in order to challenge the caretaker
government convention signalling the use of permanent campaign techniques during the
formal campaign period. The lengthy campaign resulted in rising campaign costs. This
led the major parties to intensify their efforts to secure funds to pay for the increased
cost of campaigning over longer periods. As a result incumbent MPs used parliamentary
entitlements to pay for the distribution of direct mail during the 2004 election. This
dissertation has examined the continued development of the electoral professional party
in Australia. Modern campaign techniques and technologies are filling the void of
declining mass party memberships whilst at the same time improving how parties
professionalise their operations. The 2004 election was a continuum in this process.
Existing approaches intensified whilst new appro~ches were trialled.
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APPENDIXB
Newspaper review of three major Australian newspapers during the 2004 federal
election campaign period
The Australian
Date

Reporter(s)

Title

Page

30 August

Choice: old or new, stability or change

D. Shanahan

2

30 August

'Guerilla warfare' chiefs shape up

S. Maiden

3

1 September

Latham wins the war of words

S. Lewis

1

1 September

Ads go for subliminal yuck factor

7

3 September

Labor counters rates scare campaign

4/5 September

Leaders wives seen but not heard ... much

L. Sinclair and
S. Canning
Steve Lewis and
Sid Maher
E.K. Symons

11

4/5 September

Populism and prudence

P. Kelly

32

9 September

Let's have a real debate, Mr Howard

G. Walsh

13

9 September

Party's on in the engine rooms

S. Maiden

17

9 September

The best democracy that money can buy

L. Sinclair

20

10 September

S. Lewis

9

10 September

Tough times as leader faces politics in the
raw
John Howard, a chicken debater

M. Costello

15

16 September

Ad-Lib on Hawke's 'learner'

8

17 September

Don't be honest, scares the voters

L. Sinclair and
D. Box
G. Megalogenis

8

20 September

Leader's son on preschool wait-list

S. Maiden

5

20 September

Parties gear negative visions for prime-time
seats
Coalition rolls out Latham bogeyman

L. Sinclair and
S. Maiden
S. Lewis

8
11

Party ads pull their punches and put trust in
key issues
In a close race, Howard's backing inertia

L. Sinclair

9

P. Kelly

15

L. Sinclair and
B. Hickman
L. Sinclair

8

20 September
22 September
22 September
25/26
September
28 September
30 September
30 September

Latham okays new series of terror ads
ALP goes crazy in ad blitz
Lacy lodges claim for a new era of political
wives
Election ads get up close and personal

45

L. Scott and
E. K. Symons
S. Maclean and
R. Dalton

5

6
8
17 and 22

30 September

Dodgy journos to blame for all the secrecy

G. Morris

18

1 October

Lacy 'co-brands' Mark cool

E. K. Symons

8

1 October

M. Wiese
Sackmann
L. Sinclair

9

4 October

Senators accused of misusing resources to
bolster campaign
Labor ads throw it back with interest

5 October

Timber worker fury, but green groups happy

6 October

Howard puts his promises on the line

B. Norington and
M. Denholm
S. Maiden

7 October

Hang up on PM, but it'll cost you

7 October

Ads fail to settle the tug of war

7 October

In the great polling crunch, it's the thoughts
that count
It's a party as voters blitzed

7 October
7 October
8 October

Fear the only certainty in political pitch for
hearts and minds
The campaign winner is ...

Th e S>Y<d ney M ornrng Hera ld
Date

Title

6
6
11
7

S. Maiden and
M. Sainsbury
G. Walsh

13

G. Morris

18

L. Sinclair and
S. Maclean
L. Sinclair

20
20

S. Canning

13

Reporter( s)

Page

30 August

It's a matter of trust

L. Dodson

1

30 August

Still no guarantee of serving out a full term

M. Metherell

7

1 September

C. Marriner

7

L. Dodson and
M. Metherell
P. Hartcher

8

3 September

They're off and running in the great slogan
game
Leaders follow the tight script, with a nod to
the extras
PM hammers a Big Lie to keep the ·big job

15

9 September

Friendly audience fires up a nervous starter

M. Seccombe

6

10 September

Flash of extremism moves the electoral
game into a darker setting
Making political gain out of a national crisis

L. Dodson

5

P. Hartcher

36

Blow for blow, but no killer punch

L. Dodson

1

M. Seccombe

7

20 September

A clear advantage to scrapper who
accentuated the positive
Week four, and it's time to rip the gloves off

7

24 September

The fear of living dangerously

C. Marriner and
L. Dodson
P. Hartcher

15

27 September

Now $6 billion for Howard's heroes

L. Dodson

1

3 September

11/12
September
13 September
13 September

46

29 September

An election cash rich but morally poor

A. Ramsey

15

30 September

Party and the person summed up by the
one woman in the know
An exercise in getting to know the man who
would be prime minister
It takes policy and personality

P. Totaro

7

T. Stephens

7

H. Mackay

12

M. Seccombe

6

A. Anderson

17

T. Allard

6
1

16

30 September
2/3 October
4 October

Fear and loathing on TV as campaign gets
personal
Our leaders invite you to a swingers' party

4 October
5 October
7 October

Please fasten your safety belt for a mystery
policy launch
Howard chips away in Tasmania

7 October

Howard's forest plan splits factions

7 October

8 October

Liberal phone spam doesn't ring true, say
unhappy targets
The puppeteers carry the day

M. Metherell,
S. Peating and
A. Darby
S. Peating and
A. Darby
M. Seccombe and
C. Marriner
M. Seccombe

9/1 0 October

On the money

P. Hartcher

32

9/1 0 October

Clicking with voters

A. Loewenstein

33

11 October

Primary lessons for Latham.

A. Green

10

The Australian Financial Review
Date

Title

Reporter( s)

9
11

Page

30 August

Untried team sticks near home

M. Davis

S11

30 August

J. Howard

64

M. Latham

64

31 August

We've come a long way. There's no turning
back
It's time to put back rungs in ladders of
opportunity
Mogadon Man strays off-message

M. Davis

5

31 August

Mail-out to go ahead

S. Morris

8

1 September

Mind-altering battles

N. Shoebridge

61

6 September

Trust them: ad men come to the party

9

7 September

10

9 September

Labor stays mum even as Libs take to the
airwaves
Enough of the bribes, bring on the biff

N. Shoebridge
and R. Burbury_
N. Shoebridge
D. Jaensch

63

10 September

Bomt> will be a bigger test for Latham

L. Tingle

75

11/12
September

The labours of Mark Latham

L. Taylor

19

30 August

C'

47

13 September

So much taken for granted, but no more

L. Tingle

6

13 September

Marketing the key to victory

R. Cameron

10

16 September

The unsubtle art of selling pollies

N. Shoebridge

11

16 September

Short-term equation fails endurance test

H. Morgan

63

20 September

True believer fights on his own terms

M. Davis

9

23 September

Mixed views on negative turn

N. Shoebridge

10

24 September

Dog whistle blows again

M. Davis

27

25/26
September
25/26
September
28 September

Labor is rubbing out the PM

J. Hewett

7

B. Pearson and

7

Aggressive turn in advertising strategy

N. Shoebridge

11

30 September

Lofty vision stirs true believers

J. Hewett

8

30 September

Janine speaks - ending a long tradition

J. Hewett

10

30 September

It's the message not just money

L. Taylor

12

4 October

Insulting our intelligence

G. Barker

54

5 October

Forests fig leaf could cost Latham dearly

L. Taylor

7

7 October

'We'll be steady and disciplined'

8

8 October

One last, staid show of confidence

M. Davis and
C. Murphy
L. Taylor

15

8 October

Discretion a virtue for PM's pollster

M. Skulley

16

Ready steady: ALP leader is off 'L' ·plates

L. Taylor

S3

The hidden election campaign: what the
voters never see

J. Hewett

20 and 21

8 October

How they say it still counts

A. Fabro

,.

9/1 0 October
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Appendix D
Liberal Party political advertisement: Mark Latham attack ad

Source: The Australian, p.8. (2004, September 20).
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APPENDIXE
Liberal Party political advertisement: Mayor Latham

Source: The Australian, p.20 (2004, October 7)
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Appendix F
Labor Party Political Advertisement: Scratchie Ad

Scratch off Mr Howard ...

. . . and Mr Costello is revealed •••.

Source: The Weekend Australian, p.8 (2004, September 25/26).
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Labor Party Pol"t"
Appendix G
1 1ca1Advert"•sement: Ease th e Squeeze

Source: The Australian Fmanctal
. Review p. 11 (2004 ' September 16).
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Appendix H
Liberal Party Advertisement: The Howard Government delivers

Source: The Australian, p.7. (2004, September 1).
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Appendix 1
Feedback Tips Brochure

FEEDBA

Running Feedback
r All office ~taff ~houid know how to w~e Feedback - training i:: jiaramm.u.1t to understanc
the programme

r Feedback can be operated af all time!! of the day
P.. All workstations should have Feedback running and staff showitl enter data all day

> When working in other programmes minimise Feedback
> ~mmre that constituents cannot read the computer screen if Fee-dback is open
55

feedback - Groups for Targeting
FEEDBACI
HAVE YOU IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING
GROUPS IN YOUR ElECTORATE?
v

Strong Liberals

v

Strong Nationals

v

Strong Labor (tagged as no future contact)

v

Swinging voters

v

Green/Democrat voters

v

Party members, supporters and potential boothworkers

v

Previous donors to the party/member's campaign

v

People living near weak or swinging booths

v

People living in specific streets, suburbs or towns

v

people concerned about specific federal, state or local issues

v

Census Collection Districts (CCDs)

v

New enrollees - new elector letters

v

Members of local industry or community groups

If you can't tick all of these . . you need
to get busy with feedback!!
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Feedback Overview
fEEDBACJ
..,.

WHAT IS FEEDBACK· WHAT DOES 11 PCOVIDE?

Feedback is an electronic database of your electoral roll to which you can add ir11formation and
~

-.-;,1:·

t':.~;r···~··.;;.. .~·: .' }:f·f~.'

notes about youtr~ A Feedback package provides as standard:

....
....,

:

.. ·:.'·

t/ Full name of every elector enrolled in your electorate
t/

Fuhddres~tails

t/ Phone number, where matched with the White Pages
t/ Gender
v' Date of Birth

t/ Occupation (where available)
t/ Monthly updates which add new electors and delete electors who have been removed from
your roll

t/ Transfer of contact data when people change electorates
t/ Electors are rationalised into surname groups at an address for cost efficien;l mailing
v' Feedback generates salutations for voters with the option to override a saluiali on
v' Realignment of boundaries after redistribution
t/ A separate Community Database to store local organisations, sporting groups

t/ Telephone support
v' Training and support for staff

v

Regular Tips of the Week
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E t
Appendix J
x ract (on tagging) from the Feedback Trat'n·

.M
anual

tng

"'

...f;verY Constituent has a unique Feedback ID. Thts ID can bB searched for by pressing F12 or by
·selecting Find, then Feedback ID from Edit on the mflin menu.

Adding tags to a constituent
Double clicking on a conslituenl's namro: will!al<e you inlulhat person's Details Screen This screen
is where you Add, Edit and Delete: infornralion fur !110 constituent. Herfe is an example of l<athleen
Scotl's well-tagged Details Screen:

The toolbar at the top provides standard aciions like
such as viewing Kathleen's enrolment history

Cut.

Copy &. Paste etc- as well as other features

The up/down arrow buttons ai !he top right hand corner will rnove back. and forth throughout all !he
constituents at the current address, repopulating the Details Screen for each different constituent.

How Do I Add a piece of Contact Data?
Simply click on the Add bution in thr, Details Screen anc you v,till gei the following drop-down menu:

Click on the lag you wish to add and you will be taken into the relevant screen to add, edit or delete
tags.

Because the actual process of adding tags is very simple and self-explanatory, these notes do
not cover the details of adding each individual tag.
However the following notes will help you add Individual Mail Addresses, Individual
"'"'lufations. Documents and Enquiries (these actions are a little more complex).
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Appendix K
Confidential Letter to Liberal Party MP

}JJ ltilT~tl Tl~

&

C{.NFI:Jl)I~N'I,IAL
FEEDBACK
Federal Member for

Dear···
Thankyou for your recent participation in the 2.002 Feedback Stat Audit.

We were pleased to see that this year almost every office participated in the Audit
and as a result we are in a good position to gauge the level of Feedback activity
across all offices.
Across the nation, we have identified over 500,000 federal voting preferences of
which over 106,000 have been identified as strong liberal and over 30,100 as strong
National. More importantly we have identified over 203,000 swinging voters and
75,500 soft or minor party voters.
Across all users, the average number of voters identified as strong Liberal was 1A89.
Amongst Liberal Party users that number rises to 1,802, whilst amongst users in New
South Wales the number drops to 1,019. Your office has identified 1,366 Strong
Liberal voters in the federal seat of Lindsay.
Across all Coalition users,

the

average number of swinging voters

identified

was

2,204 whilst Liberal users have identified 2,580 swinging voters on average. Your
office has identified 1,232 swinging voters, and a further 224 safe voters: weak,
persuadable or unknown Liberal Party or Labor Party voters, or else voters of the
minor parties, It is important that soft voters are not neglected when you target
your sWinging voters, as these voters are also one of our key target groups. Ideally
you will target this group with a different message, however if you chose to write to
all soft-<:~nd-swinging voters collectively, your-staff-will need to use multiple report
filters to ensure that all target voters hear from you over the course of the current
term.
At this stage of the current term, your office should be aiming to increase the
number of swinging and soft voters to at least 3,000 before the next election. With
a margin of 0.055, these 3,000 voters could mal~e a huge difference to the results of
the next federal election.
The average number of issues identified across all federal Feedback users was over
18,355, whilst the average number across New South Wales was 25A88. Your office
has

identifieclflll··············-

Over the course of the current term your office should consider making use of these
issues, informing voters of Federal Government initiatives in an area where you have
irlPntified thev have an interest. These mailout5 may be. small in number but will
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have a big impact in the long run. If your office doesn't already have a
communications plan, or would like assistance in integrating Fee~back into your
existing Communications plan, I would be more than happy to assist you and·.yotl.Jr
staff in this area.
We have also scheduled a number of training courses in Canberra dealing with the
Feedback package, These include Feedback training at beginner, introductory and
advanced level and-community database training. Your staff may benefit from
attending one-or aiLof.thesa courses.
While Feedback is one of the greatest assets available to you as a member of the
Coalition, its success or failure is a measure of the commitment in time and effort pt
into the. program by you and your staff over the course of your term. In the long
run, it will aid not just in your re-election 1 but also in the re-election or election of
your Coalition colleagues. To that en~, I would like to encourage you to continue th
excellent work undertaken by your staff in the previous term.
If you have any comments on any of the contents of this letter, I would be more
than happy to hear from you. Please feel free to contact either Damien Mantach or
myself at the GMS on (02) 6277 7088 or on mobile 0409 563 660.
Again I thank you for your participation in the audit and I would encourage you to
continue to support your staff in making Feedback a valuable part of your electorab
office management.
Yours sincerely

Lisa McDonald
Feedback Trainer

Audit Summarv..·
AverageCoalition users

Issues
Strano Liberal
Swingers

Swingers+
soft voters*

Average-

Average-

Liberal users

NSW Coalition
users
12 275

18 355
1489
2,204

19 399

3,003

3,556

1,802

1 019

2,580

1,405

(*su[t voter.\' are all voters who are neither strong Liberal, sTrong Nmional nor srrong Labor vo1er.1)
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Married to XXX and have
Xnumber of children, X..XX,
XXX, XXX.
Lived in the electorate X years
Has worked as XXX manager
for XXX company.
President of XXX
Involved in XXX community
group.
Volunteer at XXX
Actively involved in the
community with XXX
Experience in XXX
Has a XX..X University degree
Awarded XXX for XXX

Family Photo here
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Address Line 1
Address Line 2
Tel: 0000 0000 Fax: 0000 0000
Email: candidate@electorate.com.au

Liberal for {Electorate}

{Candidate Name}

Pr\nb:d & authorised by and wllh the compliments of

~New anti-terrorism laws
~Protecting our borders
~ Providing safer roads
~Work for the Dole

Supporting our Defence Forces

M

[j2f More apprenticeships

5lf Tough on Drugs

~Standards in schools

\!lf Supporting older Australians

~Keeping interest rates low
~Strengthening Medicare

il c;gmmitttul ttn .
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Candidate Photo here
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lerrorisls and illegol enlrants.

ne loan mortgage rates ore allheir lowes I level

private heollt1 insurcmce.

billion to $32 billion for the next four years.

"" Increase overall funding for schools by over $8

schools oboultheir children's education; and

,.. Ensure parents receive belter lnforrnalion from

cilizenship education in all schools;

,.. Dedi cole new funding for values, civics and

and expond access lo respile care,

.. Provide increased financial support for 'carers'

facilities: and

provide new places and upgrade the standard of

... Cornmil $2.2 billion in new funds for aged care lo

for independent relirees;

access lo lhe Commonwealth Seniors Health Card

,. Continue the Senior Australians Tax Offset and

{Candidate Name} - Liberal for {Electorate}

ure nalion, able to meet ihe challenges of the

er on our priorities for Auslralla, to deliver a

Retain the Howard Government's 30% rehole for

19 our economy strong, we can make sure we
1>

Cornmonweoltt1 Concession Cord holders; and

onlinuing to expand our inlemational trade.

for out of hospital expenses and increased
incentives for bulk billing for children under 16 and

small businesses to ere ate local jobs; ond

doctors in areos ol need, a reliable solely nel

.. Deliver o stronger tv\eclicme Ihot provides more

the cost of raising Iheir ctlilclren;

lie new opportunities for Austraflan businesses

)Of!

1e Howard Government;

11inue the responsible economic management

r, we cannot take our economy for granted.

mrepoid.

·e tl1an $70 billion of Labor's $96 billion debt has
.. Provide ciirecl paymenls lo tornilies to ossisl with

further secure our tlOrders oguinsl dn.J[J !Jofficking,

generation; and

technology one! install new P.quiprnenllo help

>rnploymenl is at twenty year lows;

,. Upgrade our inlelligence services, invest in new

funding for new equipment and facililies; and

·e Ihan 1.3 million new jobs hove been created;

'us and secure nallen.

1rd Government means Australia Is now a more

,. Bolster our ctefence forces with $1.5 !)illion in new

{Candidate Name}

"We need to keep our economy strong
so jobs are secure, interest rates are as
low as possible and families can plan
for the future with confidence .."

rs of responsible economic management by

Candidate portrait
photo here

